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— ✤ CH A PTER EIGHT ✤ —

How Capitalism
Will Change

N

iels Bohr, the brilliant Nobel laureate in physics,
once complained, “It is difﬁcult to make predictions, especially about the future.” Despite his warning,
let’s try. Even if we cannot know exactly how capitalism will change, we can, perhaps, detect some probable
trends and directions.
Our ﬁrst task is to survey some of the major forces
that could lead to important institutional transformations. We then ask what types of general systemic change
might result from such institutional transformations.
Finally, we turn to existing capitalist systems and speculate brieﬂy but with more speciﬁcity on how they might
change in the next half-century.
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Capitalism Reassessed

A. Short-Run Factors Possibly Inﬂuencing
Major Institutional and Systemic Change
Traumatic political/economic events are often a cause of
major institutional change. For instance, Russia’s defeat
in the Crimean War (1854–56) set in motion forces that
resulted in the abolition of serfdom ﬁve years later. The
Great Depression of the 1930s led to greater state intervention into the economies of the OECD nations and much
higher welfare transfers to the population. Less dramatically, British discontent with slow, uneven production
growth in the post–World War II years appears to have
played a major role in Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 political
victory and to have allowed her to make changes in the
economic system, particularly the dismantling of governmental controls and detailed planning of the economy.
Will a transformation on the scale of what happened
in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s again occur in
the OECD nations as a result of the world economic crisis
that took place at the end of the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century? To provide some perspective on this
question, Table 8–1 presents data on growth and ﬂuctuations of aggregate production from 1975 through 2007
that supplements the data presented in Table 6–3.1 While
1

The data in Table 6–3 are, however, organized according to performance system, rather than economic system. That table also looks
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Table 8–1. GDP Growth and Fluctuations in Industrial Capitalist Nations, 1975–2007 a
Country

Average Annual
GDP Growth

Fluctuation
Measure

A. Countries with a mostly Anglo-Saxon economic system
Australia
3.22%
2.35%
Canada
2.78
2.84
Ireland
5.20
9.78
Japan
2.53
6.72
New Zealand
2.25
5.33
Switzerland?
1.64
2.20
UK
2.42
3.85
USA
3.06
2.12
Average
2.89
4.27
C. Nations with a West European economic system
Austria
2.35%
1.70%
Belgium
2.12
1.57
France
2.16
1.80
Germany
2.13
3.13
Netherlands
2.58
3.03
Average
2.27
2.25
a

Country

Average Annual
GDP Growth

Fluctuation
Measure

B. Countries with a Nordic economic system
Denmark
2.14%
2.09%
Finland
2.50
5.19
Norway
3.06
2.47
Sweden
2.07
3.54

Average

2.44

3.22

D. Nations with a South European economic system
Greece
2.05%
6.56%
Italy
2.02
3.50
Portugal
2.94
4.38
Spain
2.82
3.87
Average

2.46

4.58

The ﬂuctuation measure is the average square of the deviation of each point from the ordinary least squares
regression line used to determine the average annual GDP growth rate. It is also called the “mean square error.”
The GDP data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators www.worldbank.org.

Capitalism Reassessed

economic growth was certainly not dramatic in this
period, which preceded the major economic crisis starting in 2007/2008, voters in the various countries did not
appear to be sufﬁciently discontented with the economic
system to force major changes, at least not at the time of
writing. Equally important, none of the four capitalist
economic systems in this period appears markedly superior in its macroeconomic performance. More speciﬁcally, the initial level of per capita GDP and the exposure
to the outside world (measured in terms of the ratio of
exports and imports to the GDP) are held constant, only
the mostly Anglo-Saxon economic system had slightly (but
statistically signiﬁcant) higher growth rates than nations
with the other systems; and only the nations with a West
European economic system had a slightly lower (but statistically signiﬁcant) rate of ﬂuctuation of the GDP.2

2

at growth of per capita GDP, while Table 8–1 focuses just on GDP
growth.
This calculation is similar to that shown in Table 6–3 but differs
in that other possible causes of macroeconomic performance are
held constant (namely, initial per capita GDP and openness of the
economy). I also experimented with two other measures of ﬂuctuations, the coefﬁcient of determination of the GDP regressions
and the average unemployment rate over the period. When other
factors were held constant, neither of these two indicators revealed
any statistically signiﬁcant difference between the four economic
systems.
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How Capitalism Will Change

In the recent global recession, measured from the 3d
quarter of 2007 to the 3d quarter of 2009, the average
annual decline in real GDP was 1.7 percent.3 This decline,
however, varied considerably among the OECD countries,
with the countries with a Nordic economic system experiencing the greatest average fall in GDP; and the countries
with a West European system, the least. Nevertheless,
these differences were not statistically signiﬁcant.
Such results, combined with those in Table 6–3, mean
that no particular type of capitalism provided a clear
model of emulation for the others, at least with regard
to GDP growth.4 Instead, the governments’ policies and
3

4

The data in this paragraph come from the OECD Web site www.
OECD.org and were the last available at the time of writing.
Of course, this doesn’t necessarily mean that a greatly different
economic system, such as central planning, would provide better results. For a comparison between economic performance of
capitalist and centrally planned economies, see Frederic L. Pryor,
Economic Systems of Foraging, Agricultural, and Industrial Societies (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). op. cit.; “Growth and
Fluctuations of Production in OECD and East European Nations,”
World Politics 37, no. 2 (January 1985): 204–38; and “The Performance
of Agricultural Production In Marxist and Non-Marxist Nations,”
Comparative Economic Studies 33, no. 3/1991: 95–127. These studies
show that the centrally planned nations of Eastern Europe and
the OECD nations of Western Europe did not have signiﬁcantly
different GDP growth rates and GDP ﬂuctuations. For individual
sectors, such as agriculture, the evidence is mixed and depends on
the time period and the measure of ﬂuctuations.
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factors other than the economic system seemed to be the
primary explanation for these different growth results.
Consequently, unless the downturn in production in the
industrial capitalist nations becomes considerably worse
and lasts much longer lasting than it appeared in 2010, it
seem unlikely that major systemic transformations will
occur for two reasons: First of all, radical alternatives to
capitalism, such as communist command systems, have
been discredited; secondly, systemic inertia is formidable, as was shown in the Great Depression during the
1930s, when few countries adopted total different economic systems.

B. Long-Term Economic Trends Possibly
Inﬂuencing Institutional Change
This section brieﬂy outlines some challenging worldwide
trends that are not easily met by existing institutions or
current economic policies and that point to important
institutional changes in the long-term future.

1. Demographic Changes
As everyone knows, the average age of the population in the OECD is rising. This will lead to a fall in the
ratio of people in the traditional working ages (twenty
through sixty-four) to people aged sixty-ﬁve and above.
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For the OECD nations considered in this study, this ratio
of working age to aged in 2000 averaged about 3.93;
by 2040, it will be roughly 1.92.5 In the latter year the
ratio is predicted to be highest in nations with the mostly
Anglo-Saxon and the Nordic economic systems and lowest in nations with the West European and South European
economic systems, where predicted low birth rates will
exacerbate the problem.
Obviously, the aging of the population will strain governmental pension and health care payments and oldage insurance. If current laws remain in force in the
OECD, governmental expenditures for the aged as a ratio
of the GDP are predicted to rise about twelve percentage
points between 2000 and 2040, an increase which may
be unsustainable.

2. Globalization
The word “globalization” has many meanings – political, legal, cultural, and economic. It also means that
local events – phenomena as diverse as the incidence of
disease and stock-market crashes – can have worldwide
effects. The process of globalization also has many institutional impacts. For instance, enterprise governance,
5

The data in this and the following paragraph come from Frederic
L. Pryor, Economic Systems of Foraging, Agricultural, and Industrial
Societies, op. cit., Chapter 7.
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which varies considerably between nations, even those
with the same economic system, appears to be gradually converging, at least if we can believe the anecdotes
in the business press. In this section, however, we focus
only on several common indicators of globalization (foreign trade, market integration, immigration, and international ﬂows of capital) to gain an overview of some
quantitative measures of the process.
Foreign trade, as a share of total production of goods
and services, rose almost twenty percentage points
between 1952 and 2000 for the twenty-one OECD
nations under consideration.6 Market integration – the
linking of markets for goods and services – is measured
by price convergence in the OECD countries, and this
gradually occurred, at least in the latter part of this
period. Immigration rates rose dramatically in the last
half of the twentieth century. More speciﬁcally, for the
twenty-one OECD nations, the annual ratio of new
immigrants to the total population rose from 0.2 to 0.8
percent between 1984 and 2000 (if illegal immigrants
had been included, the increase would undoubtedly be
higher). International capital (investment) ﬂows have
also soared: in the quarter century between 1972 and
6

Data for the discussion in this paragraph come from the OECD and
Frederic L. Pryor, The Future of U.S. Capitalism (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), Chapter 5.
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1997, estimated world capital ﬂows measured in constant prices, both direct (plant, equipment, and housing)
and indirect (stocks and bonds) increased at an average
annual rate of 8.3 percent, more than twice as fast as the
growth of world GDP.
In the recession years between the third quarters of
2007 and 2009, the average annual decline in the dollar
value of exports of the OECD countries of goods was 6.6
percent.7 As in the case of the GDP, however, there was
no signiﬁcant difference in the countries with different
economic systems.
Globalization also means that adverse economic
shocks arising from the actions of other countries will
have a greater impact on the domestic economy of each
nation.8 It will take years to strengthen institutions so as
7

8

These data come from the OECD Web site www.OECD.com and
were the latest available at the time of writing.
One example of the international transmission of a local crisis: early in the twenty-ﬁ rst century a group of Wisconsin school
boards borrowed money at a low interest rate from an Irish bank
to purchase collateralized debt obligations (CDO) yielding a higher
return. In 2008, when some of the underlying securities of the
CDOs collapsed in value and the CDO issuers were unable to make
their payments to the school districts, the latter could not then
meet their interest payments on the loan from the Irish bank. This,
in turn, placed the Irish bank in ﬁ nancial jeopardy, and, since it
was owned by a German bank, the parent bank also found itself
in a precarious ﬁ nancial position and had to be bailed out by the
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to regulate international economic activities and prevent
or mitigate worldwide shocks; meanwhile, we must rely
on the informal coordination of policy actions in many
countries, such as the G-20 group. In isolation, domestic
actions to counter adverse macroeconomic events will
become less effective. In a recession, for instance, the
purchasing power arising from the increased governmental expenditures of a single nation will be partially
spent abroad, so that ﬁscal policy becomes less effective. Other important implications of the globalization
process, including income convergence or divergence
between countries, must be left for others to discuss.

3. Increasing Scarcity of Natural Resources9
The world’s total use of raw materials and foodstuffs has
risen steeply in the past century because of the swelling population and increasing per capita production.
Although global population growth has been slowing
in the past few decades, the consumption of these basic
products will undoubtedly continue to grow as per capita
income increases and, other things being equal, will result

9

German government. There was no easy policy action that the
German government could on its own have taken to have prevented this international transmission of a ﬁ nancial crisis.
This discussion draws heavily upon the sources and analysis in
Pryor, The Future of U.S. Capitalism, op. cit., Chapter 6.
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in supplies become increasingly strained. Nevertheless,
this Malthusian nightmare of critical scarcities of foodstuffs and raw material and of their skyrocketing prices,
did not come true in the twentieth century. It was kept
at bay by technological progress in extracting, growing,
reﬁ ning, and processing these products, by the discovery of new mineral deposits, by the use of new land for
agriculture, and by the production of new products that
required fewer raw materials.
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether technology will
continue to win the race with scarcity. In the ﬁ rst decade
of the twenty-ﬁ rst century, the prices of many raw materials have risen much faster than the general price index.
Moreover, as the long-term price of oil has climbed, the
costs of some nonpetroleum sources of energy have
increased as well. Given the stationary or declining oil
production in most major oil-producing nations and
the relatively few new discoveries of large oil deposits,
it seems likely the long-term rising price of energy will
continue until alternative energy sources become much
more fully utilized.
Rising food prices seem likely as well: between 2000
and 2007 world food prices rose 80 percent, and many
fear even steeper increases in the future. Probable underlying causes include global warming, water shortages,
and the diversion of grains from food to the production
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of ethanol, which has, in turn, led to a reduction in the
land used for other crops and feed for animals.10
If the relative prices of raw materials, energy, and
foodstuffs rise, the low-income population will be the
hardest hit, since raw-material intensive products and
foods will cost more and thus constitute a higher share
of the spending of this group. Thus, the distribution of
real income will become more unequal. Moreover, the
higher price of raw materials also means that for a given
expenditure, fewer goods can be purchased, and for a
given dollar of investment, less growth of goods and services will result.

4. Other Challenges
a. Savings and Growth. Where population is rising and where people spend down their wealth during retirement, the overall savings rate should decline
under normal circumstances. as the number of workers
per retirees declines. More speciﬁcally, empirical studies
10

The datum on world food prices comes from Food and Agriculture
Organization, “FAO Food Price Index,” www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPriceIndex/en/ (accessed October 2008). In some
countries, such as the United States, food prices increased only
about 20 percent in the same period, which was roughly the same
as the consumer price index.
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show that a 1 percent rise in the ratio of the elderly to
workers in the economy results in a decline in the ratio
of savings to GDP of more than 0.3 percent.11 Under even
the most optimistic assumptions, the savings rate in the
OECD countries in 2040 will be only slightly more than
half the 2000 level (or even lower under more realistic
assumptions). This means that economic growth of the
OECD economies, in turn, will be considerably lower,
other things being equal. Since economic growth often
leads to higher employment and raises incomes of disadvantaged groups, the decline in economic growth will
remove an important social lubricant. As a result, tensions between income groups may rise in the future. To
avoid increased political repression, alternative institutions for alleviating such economic problems may have
to be devised.
b. Microeconomic Volatility. Volatility can arise at
the microeconomic level as well as the macroeconomic.
11

The results of various empirical studies of the impact on savings of
a rise in the elderly as a share of the population are summarized by
Robert Stowe England in The Macroeconomic Impact of Global Aging
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2002). For a simulation model of the U.S. economy that takes these
effects into account, see Frederic L. Pryor, “Demographic Effects
on Personal Saving in the Future,” Southern Economic Journal 69,
no. 3 (January 2003): 541–60.
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In the United States, for instance, certain microeconomic
volatility measures have increased in the last third of a
century, and a number of studies suggest that family
incomes vary much more from year to year than they
used to,12 a phenomenon which puts affected families at
greater risk. Risk has also risen for American families
who ﬁ nd it hard to obtain affordable health insurance
because of their preexisting health conditions or because
their pensions are switching from deﬁ ned-beneﬁt to
deﬁ ned-contribution plans (such as 401 (k) plans).13 This
trend may, however, be modiﬁed by the health care bill
signed into law in 2010, although, at the time of writing,
it is difﬁcult to know if this law will survive legal challenges. Of course, those living in capitalist countries with
established universal health insurance or with predominantly deﬁ ned-beneﬁt pension plans do not face these
12

13

Karen E. Dynan , Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel,
in “The Evolution of Household Income Volatility,” Finance and
Economics Discussion Series no. 61 (Washington, DC: Federal
Reserve Board, 2007), present their estimates of this volatility
and also provide an extremely useful survey of previous work on
the topic by others.
Peter Gosselin, in High Wire: The Precarious Financial Lives of
American Families (New York: Basic Books, 2008), discusses a wide
variety of other mounting ﬁ nancial risks faced by American families. Unfortunately, I have been unable to ﬁ nd comparable data
for other OECD nations.
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risks. Unfortunately, comparable long-term data on volatility of family incomes for other OECD countries are not
available, but such data might reveal a similar increase
in microeconomic volatility because foreign trade has a
larger role in their economies.
c. Changing Relations Between Capital and
Labor. Until recently, trends in the ownership and
management of enterprises did not point toward dramatic institutional changes in production institutions.14 During the ﬁ nancial crisis starting in 2007 and
2008, however, many governments bought shares in
14

Three quite different indicators can be used to examine these
issues: monopolization, as measured by the degree to which the
top four or eight ﬁ rms dominate the shipments of a narrowly
deﬁ ned industries; agglomeration, as measured by the share of
total employment or industrial assets accounted for by the largest one hundred or one thousand ﬁ rms; and the average size
of enterprises, as measured by labor force or assets. Despite the
growing number of mergers between enterprises, particularly
in the 1990s, trends in these indicators in the latter part of the
twentieth century give no cause for alarm and portend little
dramatic change in the coming decades. In Pryor, The Future of
U.S. Capitalism, op. cit. I discuss U.S. evidence on these matters;
for Europe over a shorter time period, see Mikael Stenkula, “The
European Size Distribution of Firms and Employment.” Research
Institute of Industrial Economics, IFN Working Paper no. 683
(Stockholm: RIIE, 2006).
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enterprises – primarily banks, but in some cases producers as well – to provide them with liquidity and to
prevent bankruptcy. At the time of writing, it is unclear
whether such steps toward “socialism” will be reversed
after the economy recovers or whether they represent a
new direction and will be extended to other sectors of the
economy. In brief, will the General Motors Corporation
(GM), which was partially nationalized in 2009, be
known in the future as “Government Motors?”
Labor markets may change as the labor force becomes
more and more heterogeneous in terms of skills, ethnicity, and lifestyle. In most OECD nations, working-class
solidarity appears to be declining, as manifested in a
falling share of unionized workers in the labor force.15
The weakening of labor unions has led to greater wage
inequality and less job security, trends reinforced both by
rising imports of labor-intensive goods from developing
countries that pay much lower wages and by an increased
willingness by employers in many countries to use wage
15

Several of the Nordic countries are exceptions to this generalization. Underlying data are provided by Miriam Golden , et al.,
“Postwar Trade-Union Organization and Industrial Relations
in Twelve Countries,” pp. 194–230 in Herbert Kitschelt et al.,
eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Jelle Visser, “Union
Membership Statistics in roughly 24 Countries,” Monthly Labor
Review 129, no. 1 (January 2006): 38–49.
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differentials as part of incentive packages to encourage
more work from their employees. These trends reinforce
the growing income inequality arising from higher relative prices of foodstuffs and raw materials.

C. Types of Systemic Change
In Chapter 4, we delineated four distinct economic systems of advanced capitalist nation, deﬁ ned in terms of
clusters of complementary institutions. This result suggests a certain “logic of institutions.” That is, an economic
institution cannot be wildly out of sync with all the other
institutions in the economic system. Thus, as a system
changes, all of its institutions must change in a related
fashion at roughly the same time. An empirical demonstration of this concept using the various institutional
characteristics presented in Economic Freedom of the World
shows that institutions and policies associated with different facets of economic freedom change together both
over time and also across countries at the same time.16
16

The calculation is carried out by Russell S. Sobel and Christopher J.
Coyne in “Cointegrating Institutions: The Time-Series Properties
of Country Institutional Measures,” submitted for publication,
2010. Their data on institutions come from James D. Gwartney and
Robert A. Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World (Vancouver: Fraser
Institute, 2008).
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Three critical questions arise from such considerations: If institutional changes occur in OECD countries,
will the same countries remain in the same economic
system, that is, will they still cluster together? Will
nations with the same economic system become even
more similar? And will the different economic systems
tend to converge?
These questions concern complex changes over time,
and an empirical study to answer them by delineating
economic systems in past years is difﬁcult to carry out
because we have few quantitative measures of institutions before 1990 – in fact, I could locate only eleven.
Although we cannot hope for conclusive answers, we
can obtain some tentative and tantalizing results.

1. Parallel versus Random Systemic Change
The “logic of institutions” suggests two types of parallel change to investigate. The ﬁ rst is parallel institutional
change, which occurs when the clustering of countries in
economic systems remains the same, even though the
individual institutional components of these systems
(or the measures of these institutions) have changed in
value. For instance, over a given period, the ratio of public expenditures to GDP in the West European countries
can always be higher than that in the mostly Anglo-Saxon
group of nations, even though the values of these ratios
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vary considerably at different points in time. These parallel changes can be contrasted with random institutional
change, which occurs when changes in the institutional
indicators follow a haphazard pattern and are quite different among countries that formerly had the same economic system.
Did the OECD nations manifest parallel or random
institutional changes? Since these nations had largely
recovered from the effects of World War II by the end of
the 1950s, I start the analysis with data for four benchmark years thereafter, namely 1960, 1970, 1980, and
1990, and then determine the rank orderings of the average values of the four economic systems for each of the
eleven institutional indicators in the benchmark years.
The test results are clean. For ten out of the eleven
institutional indicators, the rank orderings of the averages
of the four economic systems were the same in all four
years. In sum, the OECD nations have exhibited parallel
institutional change. Nevertheless, important changes
in the values of these indicators occurred. For instance,
the ratio of public consumption to total (public plus private) consumption in the Nordic nations was roughly the
same as the OECD average in the early 1950s, but it had
moved ahead of all other OECD systems by 1960, and in
the following years this gap widened even more. Thus, a
distinctive characteristic of the current Nordic economic
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system – their welfare state – began to emerge only in
the mid-1950s, even though the ideological seeds may
have been planted decades earlier.
One immediate objection to this analysis of parallel institutional change can be raised. The comparisons
involved cover only thirty years, and the relationships
might not hold over a longer period. For instance, data
on public expenditures extending back to 1870 show
sharp breaks in the rank ordering of nations before and
after World War II.17 Similarly, with regard to the openness of foreign trade, as measured by average tariff rates,
the rank orderings of the four groups of nations greatly
changed over the last 120 years, showing sharp breaks
after both world wars.18 This indicates that the logic of
17

18

The underlying data come from Thomas R. Cusack and Susanne
Fuchs, “Parteien, Institutionen und Staatsausgaben.” In Herbert
Obinger, et al., eds., Politische Ökonomie: Politik und wirtschaftliche
Leistungsproﬁle in OECD Demokratien (Opladen: Leske und Büdrich,
2003), 321–54 However, I have had to make a number of estimates to extend some of the series back to 1870. Peter H. Lindert,
Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the
Eighteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
shows that many of the differences in the rank orderings among
nations can be traced to changes in the extent of the voting franchise and the degree of democracy.
The graph of the degree of trade openness over time is complex.
Tariff rates in a worldwide sample of thirty-ﬁve nations slowly
rose from the 1870s to the ﬁ rst decade of the twentieth century,
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institutions is a phenomenon primarily relevant just in
the short and medium runs. Of course, this makes longrun prediction of changes in economic systems more
difﬁcult.
The second type of parallel change is parallel country
change, which occurs when countries with the same
economic system remain clustered together at different points in time when all institutions are taken into
account, even as the pattern of their complementary institutions changes. In contrast, random country changes
occur when countries that clustered together in one
period cease to do so later. This happens when countries
then rose dramatically from the 1920s to the late 1930s, so that at
their peak they were roughly twice as high as the late-nineteenthcentury average, and then slowly declined from the late 1940s
to the 1990s. See Christopher Blattman, Michael A. Clements,
and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Who Protected and Why? Tariffs
the World Around 1870–1938,” Harvard Institute of Economic
Research Discussion Paper no. 2010 (Cambridge, MA: HIER, 2003).
During these three periods, the relative position of countries
changed considerably. For instance, the U.S. was a high-tariff
nation in the late-nineteenth century, but in the interwar period
(up to the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill in the early
1930s) had relatively low tariffs, compared both to previous eras
and contemporary rates in other countries. Obviously certain
changes in the external international economic environment
have also been important, such as the inﬂuence after World War
II of the GATT treaty (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs)
and the creation of the European common market.

— ✤ 225 ✤ —

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 16 Mar 2020 at 16:16:23, subject to the
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760853.009

Capitalism Reassessed

in one system that had higher quantitative measures for
particular institutions than those of another system no
longer manifest such differences in the next period.
To examine parallel country changes, I employ a cluster analysis to determine the economic systems in each
of the four years under investigation. Unfortunately, the
eleven indicators available for the historical analysis are
not necessarily representative of the entire economic
system.19 In fact, for the overlap year 1990, an elevenindicator comparison placed only three-quarters of the
countries in the same clusters into which they fell when
a forty-indicator comparison was used. In the 1960–1980
period, between 48 and 57 percent of the countries were
found in the same clusters to which the forty-indicator
analysis for 1990 had allotted them.
These results are not conclusive, and three interpretations can be offered: (1) parallel country change occurs, but
it is not very strong; (2) the eleven indicators are really
not representative of all the key economic institutions;
or (3) economic systems are mutable over time. Casestudy materials can provide some clues, so let us focus on
the case of the United Kingdom in the postwar period, a
19

This discussion draws upon evidence presented in Frederic L.
Pryor, Economic Systems of Foraging, Agricultural, and Industrial
Societies, op. cit., Chapter 7.
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well-known example of a country experiencing considerable systemic change.
In a survey of a group of specialists in economic systems, a majority rated Great Britain in the early 1960s as
having more national planning and government direction of the economy than most other OECD nations.20 My
own cluster analysis using eleven institutional indicators
placed the United Kingdom in the West European system
in 1960 and not the mostly Anglo-Saxon system, which has
had a more laissez-faire economic system. For the late
1990s, a much more systematic study, using both a survey
of laws and observer opinions, put the United Kingdom
among those OECD nations with the least governmental participation in the economy.21 Correspondingly, my
own analysis of the same eleven indicators in 1990 also
placed the United Kingdom among those with a mostly
Anglo-Saxon economic system. In brief, over the thirty
years from 1960 to 1990, the capitalist economic system
of the United Kingdom had greatly changed.
The high degree of government intervention in the
U.K. economy in the 1950s and early 1960s might be
20

21

Myron H. Ross, “Fluctuations in Economic Activity,” American
Economic Review 55, no. 1 (March 1965): 158–61.
Giuseppe Nicoletti and Frederic L. Pryor, “Subjective and Objective
Measures of the Extent of Government Regulation,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 59, no. 3 (2005): 433–49.
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attributed to the self-reinforcing process of a slow wartime recovery and inertia in removing inappropriate
wartime controls of the economy. But disappointing
economic performance in the ﬁ rst three decades following World War II resulted in a shift in the balance of
political forces and, most likely, in ideology as well. In
analyzing the U.K.’s economic system, most commentators have focused on the 1979 election of Margaret
Thatcher, whose government sold off state enterprises,
reduced labor unions’ inﬂuence in national economic
policy making, and, as brieﬂy noted above, cut back the
governments’ other roles in the economy. In 1990, her
last year in ofﬁce, the economic system of the United
Kingdom had become like that of other nations in the
mostly Anglo-Saxon group. But if we look at the eleven historical indicators discussed above, this process appears to
have begun in the mid-1970s: Thatcher’s policies appear,
in part, as the culmination of a previous trend.
The lesson from this example is that a country can
change its economic system, even if the changes in particular institutions are not well synchronized with other
institutions. This requires, however, that the political
leadership be tough and strong, follow consistent policies, and be able to maintain enough political support
for a sufﬁciently long period to overcome the resistance
arising from the pain that such policies inﬂ ict because of
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the inconsistencies between institutions that have and
have not been yet changed.
One can carry out other tests of parallel country
changes, but the results come as no surprise.22 The
results above, however, show that parallel institutional
change appears to be much stronger than parallel country change. Both types of change also provide support
for the logic-of-institutions approach, at least in the short
and middle runs.

2. Converging or Diverging Systemic Changes
Do economic systems tend to become more or less similar
to each other over time? We can explore this long-term
issue by ﬁrst carrying out a cluster analysis of institutions in developing economies, using virtually the same
institutional indicators as for the OECD nations. Then by
comparing the average differences between the clusters
in the two set of countries, as well as the degree to which
these clusters explain the differences between nations
with the same economic system, we can gain some idea
about systemic changes over time.23
22

23

Most importantly, these tests included a concordance analysis of
the rank orders of countries.
Frederic L. Pryor, “Economic Systems of Developing Nations,”
Comparative Economic Studies 48, no. 1 (March 2006): 77–98. The
comparisons between the sample of OECD and developing
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The results can be quickly summarized: the clusters
of the developing economies are further apart from
each other than the OECD countries; moreover, the
differences between same-system nations are greater
in the former than the latter group of nations, that
is, the individual clusters cover a much larger institutional space among the developing countries. In brief,
both between-system and within-system distances
are greater in the developing economies. This appears
reasonable if we consider the much-different starting
points at which the developing economies began to
enter the modern age and the hypothesis, oft-expressed
by modernization theorists, that industrial economies
impose more constraints on economic operations than
agricultural economies do. Agricultural economies are
much less complex and have many fewer institutional
interconnections.
When a similar test is carried out for the OECD
nations with just the eleven available institutional indicators for 1960 through 1990, no apparent trends can
be found in the between-cluster and within-cluster distances. Again, however, we are faced with a problem of
interpretation: Are we getting these results because the
eleven-institution sample is not representative, because
economies are made in Pryor, Economic Systems of Foraging,
Agricultural, and Industrial Societies, op. cit., Chapter 7.
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the time period is too short, or because convergence is
solely a long-term phenomenon?

3. Speed of Change
Institutions can seem frozen in time. For instance, in the
OECD nations, the measures of the central bank’s policy
independence from the Ministry of Finance showed little
variation from the 1950s to the 1990s, that is, until the
establishment of the European Central Bank. The most
noticeable exception was the increasing policy independence of the South European central banks, which went
from well below the OECD average in 1951 to about
average in 1990.
In other cases, institutional changes were slow but
apparent, and in one direction. For example, in the OECD
economies governmental expenditures (both consumption and transfers) as a ratio of GDP rose steadily over
this period from 26.3 percent in 1952 to 44.5 percent in
1990. Similarly, indicators of other institutions, such as
worker protection against job loss and openness of trade
in goods, services, and capital, also showed a steady
increase over time.
In still other cases, institutional changes have been
reversed: that is, the system changed in the short run
but not in the long run. For instance, in the year immediately following the end of World War II, there was a
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strong wave of nationalization of industry in most OECD
nations. In the ensuing four decades, however, public
ownership of the means of production declined in most
of these same nations.24 As noted above, government
ownership also increased during the ﬁ nancial crisis
that started in late 2007, and this institutional change
may (or may not) be temporary. Other cases of the rise
and fall of particular institutions are more difﬁcult to
characterize.25
Finally, systemic change can sometimes occur quite
rapidly. Military occupation and/or a political revolution
can result in a dramatic and rapid overhaul of the economic system, as was seen in the ﬁrst decade after World
War II in Central and Eastern Europe. In these countries,
the imposition of a new economic system, communism,
was bloody and repressive. Rapid systemic change again
24

25

Piet Angelo Toninelli, The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in
the Western World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
For instance, it is sometimes argued that corporatist institutions reveal a similar rise and fall. Certainly, some trappings of
corporatism disappeared in some European countries after the
mid-1970s, following the oil shock and subsequent economic
difﬁculties. Nevertheless, according to the research I reported
in “Corporatism as an Economic System,” Journal of Comparative
Economics 12, no. 3 (September 1988): 317–44, the tide of corporatism was not ebbing in the OECD as a whole, at least up to 1990,
even though such a trend is found in some OECD countries.
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occurred in this region from the early 1990s to the early
2000s after the fall of communism; and, while it was not
bloody, it, too, was painful for large portions of the population.26 Rapid systemic changes can also be triggered,
as noted above, from defeat in warfare or a disastrous
economic crisis.
For the industrial OECD nations, rapid systemic change
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. As one may
infer from the previous discussion, there are few indicators (except for, possibly, the nationalization of industry)
that we will see major shifts toward one particular type
of capitalism rather than another. Furthermore, parallel country change seems likely to persist: in the near
future the grouping of nations into particular economic
systems will probably be quite similar to what it is today,
as will the relative degree to which certain institutions
are manifest in the various countries.
On the other hand, it also seems highly likely that the
capitalist economic systems of industrial nations will
gradually converge in the very long run. First, most of
these nations belong to the European Union, which is
trying to harmonize the business practices and laws of
its member nations. Second, all of the nations belong to
26

See Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation
of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Europe (New York,
NY : Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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certain international organizations, such as the Bank
for International Settlements in Basel or the World
Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva, which are
likewise aiming for uniformity. Third, between the early
1950s and 2000, differences in the level of economic
development (measured by per capita GDPs) of the various nations narrowed considerably, and this trend seems
likely to continue in the future.27

D. Future Systemic Change
in the OECD Nations
Having looked brieﬂy at the types and processes of systemic change, we might try to speculate on exactly how
these economic systems will be different in the far future.
But while the discussion up to now of parallel institutional and systemic change, systemic convergence, and
speed of systemic change may vary in the future, these
concepts do not help very much in predicting particular
changes in individual systems.
However, several ways to analyze future systemic
changes are still open to us. Since we used forty indicators of economic institutions to deﬁ ne the four economic
27

The data underlying this statement come from Angus Maddison,
The World Economy (Paris: OECD, 2003).
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systems of the industrial OECD nations, we could examine how the forces underlying institutional change will
impact each of the indicators. A less tedious method is to
explore the most probable changes in what I believe to
be the institutions most likely to experience important
transformations. These changes mostly refer to industrial capitalist countries in general; only a country-bycountry survey of laws and institutions can reveal which
economic systems will be most affected.

1. Financial Sector
As indicated in Chapter 6, the world economic crisis
starting in 2007/2008 was primarily triggered by events
in the ﬁ nancial sector. If governments wish to avoid similar downturns in the future, the ﬁ nancial sector must
experience important institutional and policy changes
in the years to come. It is unclear, however, how large
these changes will be, given the array of powerful political forces opposing any major modiﬁcations. Change
might be conﬁ ned primarily to regulation procedures, or
it might go further and alter the structure of other sectors as well.
Regarding bank regulation, a recent IMF analysis of commercial bank performance in eleven OECD
nations showed clearly that governmental regulation
of bank liquidity and of the relative roles of bank-asset
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funding from deposits and from borrowing, signiﬁcantly
affected bank performance and failures in late 2007.28
This suggests that if the regulatory regime is improved,
major structural reforms may not be necessary in some
countries.
Markets for various exotic derivatives, sub-prime
mortgages, collateralized debt obligations, credit default
options, and similar ﬁnancial instruments will undoubtedly be more constrained in the future.29 For instance,
banks bundling many mortgages into a new securities
may be required to retain a certain percentage of these
28

29

Lev Ratnovski and Rocco Huang. “Why Are Canadian Banks
More Resilient?” IMF Working Paper WP/09/152 (Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009). Another study by
Andrea Beltratti and René Stulz, “Why Did Some Banks Perform
Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the
Impact of Governance and Regulation,” The National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 15180 (Cambridge, MA: NBER,
2009) also shows the importance of certain regulatory policies,
although it places more emphasis on bank governance as a factor
of bank performance during the crisis period from 2007 up to
2009.
It is noteworthy that Africa, where most countries limit the types
of activities in which ﬁ nancial institutions can engage, was the
only continent untouched by the recent ﬁ nancial crisis (at least
up to the time of writing). This suggests one useful way in which
the more “advanced” countries might change their economic
systems.
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new securities, so that they will bear part of the risk of
default and, thus, will be more conscious of the risks they
are passing on to others. This percentage might also be
adjustable by the central bank, just as some central banks
can adjust the margin for individuals buying securities
on credit. In addition, certain banking practices, such
as “liar loans” (loans given with no investigation of the
borrowers’ stated income or ability to repay) (these were
also called NINJA loans, indicating that borrowers had
no income, no job, and no assets), or the sale of highinterest (sub-prime) mortgages to those with little ability
to pay them off might be similarly restricted. Stricter controls may also be placed on the activities of hedge funds
and other ﬁrms leveraging their capital by borrowing at
low interest rates to speculate on allegedly high-yielding
assets. It also seems likely that the degree of ﬁnancial
leveraging by banks, “nonbank banks,” hedge funds, and
the like, will also be further restricted. In brief, we can
probably expect constraints on a great many ﬁnancial
activities, businesses, and individuals that heretofore have
received little governmental pressure to reduce ﬁnancial
leveraging. Whether these measures will be sufﬁcient to
avoid the kind of economic shocks recently experienced
by the world’s ﬁnancial sector remains to be seen.
Structural transformations of the ﬁ nancial sector, originating either internally or in response to government
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actions, may also take place in some countries. An
important transformation occurring during the ﬁ nancial crisis that began in late 2007 was the considerable
consolidation of banks in some OECD nations, as strong
banks purchased weaker ones to save them either from
illiquidity or bankruptcy. At that time, this trend did
not cause great alarm since some econometric evidence
suggests that countries with more concentrated banking
structures are less likely to experience banking crises.30
Nevertheless, increasing concentration of the ﬁ nancial
sector can, in some cases, lead to increasing concentration of investment or production, which has negative
consequences. The growing importance of sovereign
wealth funds (investment funds controlled by governmental agencies) in certain nations with large deposits
of raw materials and oil tends also to promote centralization of the ﬁ nancial sector. Although governmental
actions can limit concentration of the ﬁ nancial sector, it
is unclear whether these steps will be taken.

2. Government Sector
In major respects, the power of governments to inﬂuence aggregate economic activities will become weaker.
30

Thorsten Beck , Asli Demirgüç–Kunta, and Ross Levine, “Bank
Concentration, Competition, and Crises: First Results,” Journal of
Banking and Finance 30, no. 5 (2006): 1581–1603, presents evidence for this claim.
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Such a process can already be seen in federal countries,
such as the United States or Germany, where the subordinate governmental units (for instance, the states
of the United States, Länder in Germany) have little
impact on macroeconomic aggregates in their areas of
jurisdiction. Moreover, as we saw earlier, increasing globalization will probably lead to greater aggregate volatility since globalization makes nations more vulnerable
to economic shocks originating abroad. At the same
time, moreover, the national governments will have
fewer macroeconomic tools with which to offset cyclical swings because the increased volume of imports will
diminish the impact of governmental intervention. That
is, more of the new purchasing power (money) pumped
into the economy by the government to offset declines in
consumption will go abroad rather than circulate internally. Similarly, attempts by governments to stimulate
investment by lowering interest rates may speed up the
outﬂow of investment funds to countries with higher
interest rates. The governments of the European OECD
nations have essentially handed over their monetary
power to the European Central Bank, which may not
be willing to take interest rate actions that would affect
all countries in the monetary union just to assist a few
distressed countries.
Globalization will lead to a similar weakening of regulatory powers, as countries are forced to coordinate their
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microeconomic policies – either through a supranational organization, treaties, or by very frequent contact.
National regulations are also enfeebled by the increasing importance of services, which are difﬁcult to control because of their heterogeneity and complexity. For
instance, a contributing cause of the 2007/2008 ﬁ nancial crisis was the sale of derivative securities by ﬁ nancial
companies. These securities were so complex that few
people – including the professional rating agencies – were
able (or willing) to assess their risks. In the United States,
the institutions selling such securities did not care about
the risk as long as it could be passed on to others, and
when the liabilities could not be paid off, a chain reaction of bankruptcies began.
But just as governments ﬁ nd themselves less able to
control the economy, citizens will be expecting them to
do more: they will demand governmental actions that
protect family income from the greater volatility accompanying globalization, especially since individuals can
not easily take countermeasures by themselves. Such
governmental policies would include both direct transfer payments and various indirect actions such as greater
regulation of private pensions and more constraints on
markets for consumer goods and services. Many of these
measures, which have been in place in the Nordic countries, will have to be introduced in some of the other
economic systems as well.
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During the global recession starting in late 2007, the
share of public expenditures in the GDP rose to stimulate
the economy by providing additional purchasing power,
to bail out various ﬁ nancial enterprises and other enterprises, and to pay for greater welfare expenditures. How
long these additional expenditures will last is, at the time
of writing, unknown. However, it seems certain that the
share of public expenditures in the GDP will rise in the
future, driven by the rising ratio of the elderly to those
in the working cohorts and by the rising costs of medical
care as increasingly expensive cures are brought on line.
Of course, countermeasures could be taken: raising the
retirement age and/or the age at which pensions from
the social insurance system are received; reducing the
per capita amount of these payments; rationing the medical services ﬁ nanced by the government; or cutting back
on other government expenditures, such as education,
defense, agriculture, or economic regulation. Politically,
however, these steps are very difﬁcult to take and elected
governments propose or implement such measures only
at their peril.

3. The Labor Sector
The political and economic power of workers seems to
be trending downward in most OECD nations. The share
of union workers has fallen in most countries, a trend
that is likely to continue as service workers become an
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ever-rising share of the labor force. In some – but not
all – OECD nations, this weakening of workers’ power
can also be seen in the declining share of labor income
in the national income (after removing the labor income
of corporate ofﬁcers)31 and a widening wage inequality,
abetted by an ever-increasing downward pressure on the
wages of low-skilled workers as labor-intensive imports
from developing countries that pay their workers lower
wages enter the market.
As noted above, the aging of the population in the
OECD nations will result in less net saving and lower
economic growth. This may well exacerbate the social
tensions arising from widening income inequalities
because countries will be less able to alleviate poverty
through economic growth alone. A fraying of the social
fabric may also result from the growing heterogeneity of
the population that is brought on by immigration. For
instance, studies show that democratic governments in
areas with more heterogeneous populations spend less
on social services and education. On the other hand,
alienation from the government, as manifested by such
indicators as the willingness of people to cheat on their
taxes, does not seem to have changed very much for
31

For the United States, relevant data are provided and analyzed by
Philip Jefferson and Frederic L. Pryor, “Dynamics of U.S. Factor
Income Shares,” Journal of Income Distribution, 19, no. 1 (March 2010).
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the OECD as a whole, at least in the 1990s.32 Again, we
face the problem that we can identify general systemic
changes without being able to determine exactly how
individual systems will change.

4. A Brief Summary
The discussion up to now has provided a general ﬂavor of possible future changes in the economic system.
Each nation or economic system has its peculiar circumstances, of course, and predicting the individual trajectories of each is beyond the scope of this the present survey.
Therefore, discussion in this chapter has focused on the
direction of general changes in institutions rather than
to speciﬁc changes in particular countries or systems.
While we can point to imperfections in current institutions that compose the economic system and speculate
on how they can be improved, it is much more difﬁcult
to determine how any changes taken will ﬁt together,
especially since modiﬁcations in one institution may
32

Ronald Inglehart et al., Human Beliefs and Values (Mexico
City: Siglo XXI Editores, 2004), present survey data for many
nations on responses to the question of whether it is justiﬁable
to cheat on one(s taxes if one has a chance (question F116). For
the OECD nations between 1990 and 2000, no signiﬁcant change
in responses occurred, even when per capita GDP and economic
system are held constant.
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inﬂuence the performance of another. For instance,
alterations in the ﬁ nancial system may lead to less investment and economic growth, which, in turn, can affect
the operation of the labor market. Thus, gaining insight
into the operation of the entire system, which embraces
many different but interconnected, institutions, is a particularly difﬁcult task.
Recent election campaigning in various OECD nations
leads to the unfortunate conclusion that few politicians
have a sufﬁciently consistent vision of the future economic system to make wise policy decisions or to implement a consistent program for changing the economic
system.

E. Parting Words
This short book has covered a great deal of territory.
We have seen why capitalism emerged in northwestern
Europe in the nineteenth century rather than in other
parts of the world. There were a variety of enabling factors in Northwestern Europe, including a higher level of
economic development, a system of law and order that
more or less prevailed, protection of private property, the
existence of institutions that helped to spread new technological knowledge, and national governments that generally provided the necessary roads and other overhead
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capital but did not greatly interfere in production. Among
the current industrialized nations of the OECD, we saw
how the conﬁgurations of economic institutions lead us
to delineate four economic systems.
The economic and social/economic performance indicators of the OECD countries in the sample fall into the
same distinct country groups as the countries in the economic and social systems. Although these economic systems do not greatly differ in their performance, they do
show considerable differences in their social/economic
outcomes. In the economic sphere, for instance, although
the mostly Anglo-Saxon nations have signiﬁcant investment efﬁciency (that is, higher output per unit of additional investment), but also greater income inequality at
high incomes and higher levels of air pollution, they do
not signiﬁcantly differ in most other performance measures. In a given economic system, countries that score
higher for a one set of performance indicators may score
lower than countries than other economic systems for a
different set of indicators, so that a trade-off of performance variables seems to occur. We could not, however,
ﬁ nd any evidence that any of these economic systems
produced happier people.
Barring cataclysmic economic events, we can expect
current OECD economic systems to evolve slowly and in
a piecemeal fashion, with changes in a few institutions
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occurring in one period, followed in subsequent periods
by adjustments in other institutions. Although it is difﬁcult to make predictions, I have tried to point to those
areas in which system change is most likely to occur in
the ﬁelds of ﬁ nance, government, and labor.
This reassessment of capitalism allows us to reconsider
the big questions about our economic system: What is
capitalism? How does it usually perform? Where is the
system going, and do we need to change it totally to
avoid a repetition of our current economic difﬁculties? I
hope that I have provided a new perspective from which
to address these questions. It is my hope that this book
has provided fresh insights into capitalism and on some
potential changes to this system that may happen in the
future.
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